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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Practice and Procedure-Evidence to be Considered on Motion
to Nonsuit-North Carolina Rule*
What evidence is to be considered by the trial court on motion of
nonsuit? The North Carolina Supreme Court in the recent case of
Atkins v. White Transportation Company' has attempted to collect and
clarify the rules pertaining to this important question.
In the principal case plaintiff's driver was operating a loaded truck
at a speed approximating 25 miles per hour over a street 25 to 30 feet
wide within 20 feet of defendant's bus ahead. As defendant's bus be-
gan to stop plaintiff's driver applied his brakes, but he was so near the
* The author wishes to thank Mr. Francis E. Winslow of the Rocky Mount,
North Carolina, Bar, for his assistance in the preparation of this Note.224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. (2d) 208 (1944) (4-3 decision).
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bus and traveling at such a rate of speed he could not stop the truck
or turn so as to avoid collision. Plaintiff alleged negligence in the
operation of the bus; the defendant denied negligence, pleading con-
tributory negligence on the part of the truck driver. On motion of
nonsuit made at the conclusion of all the evidence, it was held on appeal
that such motion should have been granted. The plaintiff's driver was
operating the truck so near the bus and at such a rate of speed that
he created a hazard such as was his duty to avoid.
Cases in North Carolina are legion involving the question of evi-
dence to be considered on motion of nonsuit. There is some apparent
conflict of authority, but not a real one, on this issue. A careful anal-
ysis of the cases reveals that practically all the cases fall within well-
defined limits under the statute.2
The Hinsdale Act3 as amended expressly provides for motion of
nonsuit at two points in the trial:
(1) At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence; or
(2) If the motion of nonsuit at the end of the plaintiff's evidence is
overruled, the defendant may (a) either except and, upon adverse ver-
dict and judgment, appeal immediately, or (b) waive the exception and
introduce his evidence; then again move to dismiss after all the evidence
is in. If this motion is refused, he may except; and after the jury
has rendered its verdict, he has the benefit of the latter exception on
appeal. When the defendant chooses to offer evidence after the court's
refusal to grant a motion of nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence,
only the exception taken at the conclusion of all the evidence can be
considered on appeal.4 Furthermore, the motion actually must be made
at the conclusion of -defendant's evidence, else he cannot complain.8
Where such motion is made, it is discretionary with the trial judge,
before passing on it, to allow the plaintiff to introduce additional
evidence.'
The trial court may grant a nonsuit on its own motion at the end
of the defendant's evidence where the evidence would justify a directed
verdict, since both a directed verdict and motion as of nonsuit have
the same legal effect.7 And in such case the court must consider the
evidence as a whole without passing on its weight or probative force.8
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-183.
3Ibid.
'Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 211 N. C. 54, 188 S. E. 609 (1936) ; Harrison
v. N. C. Ry. Co., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927) ; Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C.
408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925).
'Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 211 N. C. 54, 188 S. E. 609 (1936).
' Featherston v. Wilson, 123 N. C. 623, 31 S. E. 843 (1898) ; accord, Pearson v,
Simon, 207 N. C. 351, 177 S. E. 124 (1934) (Here the rights of the defendants
under this section were not affected by the action of the court.).
' Ferrell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 420, 181 S. E. 327 (1934).8 Lamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. 436, 86 S. E. 179 (1915).
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But the judge cannot reserve his ruling on motion of nonsuit until after
rendition of a verdict by the jury, then set aside the verdict for in-
sufficiency of evidence as a matter of law and grant the motion of non-
suit made at the close of all the evidence. 9* However, he can set the
verdict aside as a matter within his discretion.10
Where the defendant has pleaded a counterclaim and moves at the
conclusion of plaintiff's suit for a judgment of nonsuit, the defendant
thereby submits to a voluntary nonsuit on his counterclaim.1" But
where the answer pleads counterclaim, the plaintiff may not take a vol-
untary nonsuit over the dlefendant's objection.'2 In a case where the
defendant sets up a counterclaim arising out of a contract declared upon
by the plaintiff, the defendant may not withdraw his counterclaim over
exception by the plaintiff in order to enter a motion as of nonsuit.'3
In the Atkins case,14 supra, Mr. Justice Barnhill and Chief Justice
Stacy in concurring opinions, seem to lay down five principal rules for
determining the evidence to be considered on motion of nonsuit under
the Hinsdale Act. The statute provides that the motion is to be de-
cided upon consideration of all the testimony, but the following rules
tend to clarify the meaning of the Act:
1. Generally speaking, the evidence is to be taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and he is entitled to the benefit of every rea-
sonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn there-
from.15 A few of the older cases permit only the plaintiff's evidence to
be considered on motion of nonsuit,16 but the court has long since aban-
G*Jones v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 210 N. C. 559, 187 S. E. 769 (1936) ; Batson
v. City Laundry Co., 202 N. C. 560, 163 S. E. 600 (1932) ; same case, 205 N. C.
93, 170 S. E. 136 (1933) ; same case, 206 N. C. 371, 174 S. E. 90 (1934) ; same
case, 209 N. C. 223, 183 S. E. 413 (1936) ; accord, Riley v. Stone, 169 N. C. 421,
86 S. E. 348 (1915) (Same rule applies where judge believes the verdict contrary
to the evidence.) ; Wilson Cotton Mills v. Randleman, 115 N. C. 475, 20 S. E. 770
(1894) (An exception that there is no evidence on an issue can only be taken
before the verdict.). See Winslow, Transfer of Rule-Making Power from Legis-
lative to Judicial Department, A Responsibility of the Bar (1942) 21 N. C. L.
REV. 16.
"0Lee v. Penland, 200 N. C. 340, 157 S. E. 31 (1931); State v. Kiger, 115
N. C. 746, 20 S. E. 456 (1894).
It is interesting to note that the federal rule is contra. See FEDERAL RULE
50(b)." Bourne v. Sou. Ry. Co., 224 N. C. 444, 31 S. E. (2d) 382 (1944).
" Aetna Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 200 N. C. 251, 156 S. E. 515 (1931) ; Yellowday v.
Perkinson, 167 N. C. 147, 83 S. E. 341 (1914).
13 McGee v. Frohman, 207 N. C. 475, 177 S. E. 327 (1934).
1, Note 1, supra.
1 Plumidies v. Smith, 222 N. C. 326, 22 S. E. (2d) 713 (1942) ; Queen City
Coach Co. v. Lee et al., 218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. (2d) 341 (1940) ; Barnes v. Town
of Wilson, 217 N. C. 190, 7 S. E. (2d) 359 (1940) ; Coltrain v. Atl. Coast Line
Ry. Co., 216 N. C. 263, 4 S. E. (2d) 853 (1930) (This is true whether the evi-
dence is offered by the plaintiff or elicited from the defendant's witnesses.) ; White
v. N. C. Ry. Co., 216 N. C. 79, 3 S. E. (2d) 310 (1939).
"o See, for example, Allen v. Gardner, 182 N. C. 425, 428, 109 S. E. 260, 262
(1921); Brown v. N. C. Ry. Co., 172 N. C. 604, 607, 90 S. E. 783, 785 (1916);
McAtee v. Branning Mfg. Co., 166 N. C. 448, 455, 82 S. E. 857, 865 (1914).
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doned this theory. Today, where the evidence of the plaintiff and de-
fendant is conflicting, the court disregards the evidence of the defendant
and uses such expressions as "... only the evidence which is favorable
to the plaintiff may be considered";17 or ". .. the often repeated rule
that the evidence which makes for the plaintiff's claim, or tends to sup-
port his cause of action, is to be taken in its most favorable light for the
plaintiff" ;18 or ". . the plaintiff's evidence (on counterclaim) is disre-
garded, as the jury believed the evidence of the defendants."' 9  On
'defendant's motion of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence, all of the
plaintiff's evidence must be taken as true,20 and if there is any substan-
tial evidence, more than a scintilla, to support the plaintiff's allegations,
then the case must be submitted to the jury.21 The court must con-
sider the evidence as a whole without passing on its weight or probative
force,22 and the mere fact that there are contradictory statements made
by the plaintiff's witnesses is not sufficient grounds for sustaining a
motion for nonsuit, provided there is any favorable evidence for the
plaintiff.2*
2. The evidence of the defendant may be considered when it is
favorable to the plaintiff. Although the statute requires a consideration
of the whole evidence, only that part of the defendant's evidence which
is favorable to the plaintiff can be taken into consideration on motion
of nonsuit, since otherwise the trial court would necessarily pass upon
the evidence, the credibility of which rests solely with the jury. In
passing on the motion of nonsuit, the trial court's power is limited to
ascertaining whether there is any evidence at all which has any pro-
bative value in any or all of the facts and circumstances offered in the
guise of proof.
24
3. When not in conflict with plaintiff's evidence, the defendant's
evidence may be used to explain or nake clear the evidence offered by
1 Calhoun v. Nantahala Power and Light Co., 216 N. C. 256, 260, 4 S. E. (2d)
858, 861 (1939).
" Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N. C. 515, 521, 11 S. E. (2d) 721, 724 (1940).
"Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N. C. 320, 324, 11 S. E. (2d) 341, 343
(1940).( Williams v. May, 173 N. C. 78, 91 S. E. 604 (1917).
21Calhoun v. Nantahala Power and Light Co., 216 N. C. 256, 4 S. E. (2d) 858
(1939).22Lamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. 436, 86 S. E. 179 (1915).
"* Gunn v. Blue Bird Taxi Co., 212 N. C. 540, 193 S. E. 747 (1937); Mat-
thews v. Cheatham et al., 210 N. C. 592, 188 S. E. 87 (1936) ; Dozier v. Wood,
218 N. C. 414, 181 S. E. 336 (1935); Barnett v. Smith, 171 N. C. 535, 88 S. E.
770 (1916). The reason for this rule is that the jury must pass upon the evidence,
and the judge is without power to take it away. Dickerson v. Reynolds, 205 N. C.
770, 172 S. E. 402 (1934).
24 Wall v. Bain, 222 N. C. 375, 378, 23 S. E. (2d) 330, 331 (1942). See David-
son v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 207 N. C. 790, 792, 178 S. E. 603, 604 (1935).
Also see Tarrant v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. (2d) 565
(1942) and Means v. Carolina Central Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 424, 35 S. E. 813 (1900),
which Chief Justice Stacy cites to support the above rule.
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the plaintiff. This rule applies even though the evidence necessarily is
not favorable to the plaintiff, provided, however, the evidence nowise
conflicts with the plaintiff's.2 5
4. The evidence of the defendant may be considered when, taken
in connection with plaintiff's evidence, it makes manifest natural or
physical circumstances which bar recovery.26 Under this rule, though
there is some conflict of testimony, still if the facts and circumstances
clearly show that the cause of the accident was due to plaintiff's negli-
gence, the court can order a nonsuit.
27 *
Originally in North Carolina there was considerable doubt under the
statute whether a plea of contributory negligence-the burden of such
issue being on the defendant--could be taken advantage of on motion
to nonsuit,28 but it is now well settled that such may be done when the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is established either by the plain-
tiff or by the defendant.
29
5. The defendant's evidence may be considered when, taken in con-
"2 Gregory v. Travellers Ins. Co., 223 N. C. 124, 25 S. E. (2d) 398 (1943);
Godwin v. AUt. Coast Line Ry. Co., 220 N. C. 281, 17 S. E. (2d) 137 (1941);
Haynes Funeral Home v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. (2d) 820
(1939) ; Sellars et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Henderson, 214 N. C. 300, 199 S. E.
266 (1938); Harrison v. N. C. Ry. Co., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927);
State v. Fulcher, 184 N. C. 633, 113 S. E. 769 (1922).
" Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S. E. (2d) 887 (1942) ; Powers v. Stem-
berg, 213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938).
?*In Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S. E. (2d) 887 (1942) defendant,
whose car had no tail light, slowed his car from 45 miles per hour to about 25 and
turned left, whereupon plaintiff's car, which was trailing closely behind, struck
defendant's car. The accident occurred on a straight highway 30 feet wide. There
was a conflict in the testimony as to whether or not defendant's car came to a
complete stop and whether or not defendant had said that it was his fault. The
court held that the plaintiff had proved himself out of court by showing that his
negligent act of trailing the car so closely contributed to the injury received.
In Powers v. Steinberg & Co., 213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938) plaintiff was
riding with a friend, who was driving on icy roads. They approached a wrecked
automobile. Evidence of the estimated speed of approach conflicted-between 25
and 60 miles per hour. There was conflicting testimony also as to whether or not
defendant flagged the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding. Neverthe-
less, the car in which plaintiff was riding skidded 25 or 30 feet and struck de-
fendant's parked truck with such an impact that the plaintiff's car was knocked
five to ten feet. The court held that the force with which the driver of plaintiff's
car struck the defendant's parked car established the negligence of the driver of
the car in which plaintiff was riding as the proximate cause of the accident. The
driver admitted that he could have stopped but for the ice and he knew the con-
dition of the road.
Mr. Chief Justice Stacy applied this rule to the principal case.
2" Powell v. Sou. Ry. Co., 125 N. C. 370, 34 S. E. 530 (1899) ; Whitley v. Sou.
Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 987, 29 S. E. 783 -(1898) (Note in these cases cited the motion
was made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence.).
"' Godwin v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co:, 220 N. C. 281, 17 S. E. (2d) 137 (1941);
Hayes v. Western Union Telegraph Co. et al., 211 N. C. 192, 189 S. E. 499 (1937);
Hinshaw v. Pepper, 210 N. C. 573, 187 S. E. 786 (1936); Lincoln v. Atl. Coast
Line Ry. Co., 207 N. C. 787, 178 S. E. 601 (1935) ; Baker v. Atl. Coast Line Ry.
Co., 205 N. C. 329, 171 S. E. 342 (1933) ; Thompson v. Purcell Const. Co., 160
N. C. 390, 76 S. E. 266 (1912) ; Neal v. Carolina Central Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 634,
35 S. E. 117 (1900).
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nection with plaintiff's evidence, it puts an end to the suit as a matter
of law. Note that the rule states "in connection with plaintiff's evi-
dence." These words imply that such evidence of defendant must not
conflict with that of plaintiff, but rather explain it.80
It appears that these rules may be condensed into two major prem-
ises: (1) Where the evidence of the plaintiff and defendant is in con-
flict, on motion of nonsuit by the defendant the court shall disregard
the evidence of the defendant and consider only that evidence of the
plaintiff which is favorable to his cause of action. (2) Where the de-
fendant's evidence shows affirmative facts and circumstances which do
not conflict with the plaintiff's evidence, but merely serve to explain
and clarify and complete the picture as drawn by plaintiff's evidence,
the court takes into consideration all the evidence favorable to the plain-
tiff, and also the independent facts and circumstances proven by the
defendant, which are uncontradicted by the plaintiff.
There is no essential conflict between the two lines of cases today.
While the court has used expressions such as ". . . the reviewing court
cannot consider the evidence of the defendant, whether contradicted
or uncontradicted, except in such respect as it may tend to support
plaintiff's case," they were used in cases in which they were unneces-
sary to a decision and were, therefore, obiter dicta.30 Where there is
no evidence on the part of defendant of independent facts and circum-
stances unchallenged by the plaintiff, the defendant's evidence is disre-
garded; and there is no occasion to explain that if there had been such
evidence, it would have been considered. Neither line of cases attempts
to overrule the other line, and both together develop a sound rule.
Neither line of cases, if considered as overruling the other, would ex-
press the intent of the legislature as set forth in the Hinsdale Act as
amended.
Under the constitution of this state, the rule-making power for courts
inferior to the Supreme Court is vested, initially at least, in the Gen-
eral Assembly,31 and its statutes are binding on the courts. The Supreme
Court has expressed the intent of the legislature in many cases. In
Parlier v. Sou. Ry. Co., the first case to be 'decided after the 1901
amendment to the Hinsdale Act, Chief Jtistice Furches said: "But at
the close of all the evidence, he (defendant) might renew his motion
to dismiss, and this motion stiod upon a consideration of the whole
evidence introduced by the plaintiff and the defendant."32  The late
Judge Adams in Buitler v. Holt-Willianison Manufacturing Co. said that
30 Crawford v. Crawford, 214 N. C. 614, 200 S. E. 421 (1939) ; Hare v. Well,
213 N. C. 484, 196 S. E. 869 (1938).
"I' Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 181, 13 S: E. (2d) 242, 244 (1941).
"See N. C. GEN. STAT. §§7-20, 7-21.
3- 129 N. C. 262, 263, 39 S. E. 961, 962 (1901).
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upon defendant's exception to denial of both motions to dismiss: "... all
the evidence introduced at the trial must be accepted as true and con-
strued in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."3 3  Chief Justice
Stacy in Davidson v. Telegraph Co. said: "The defendant's evidence,
which conflicts with that tending to support plaintiff's claim, is not to
be considered on demurrer or motion of nonsuit." 34 And in Lynn v.
Pinehurst Silk Mills Justice Clarkson wrote: "An exception to a mo-
tion to dismiss in a civil action, taken after the close of plaintiff's
evidence, and renewed by the defendant after the introduction of its
own evidence, does not confine the appeal to plaintiff's evidence alone.
' 3 5
By express terms of the statute as construed by the Supreme Court,
the unchallenged evidence of the defendant, serving to explain and
clarify and fill out the facts of the case, must be considered on such a
motion. When each decision is analyzed on the basis of its facts, there
are no modern decisions of our court to the contrary. If so, it must
have been an inadvertence.
The rule is also in accord with reason and logic. Where the burden
of proof is on a defendant to prove an affirmative defense and his evi-
dence is unchallenged by the plaintiff, and he moves for a peremptory
instruction on the ground that only one inference can be drawn, and
that in his favor, the court considers his evidence-all of which is un-
contradicted by the plaintiff.30 Since this is true, it would be highly
illogical to hold that where the burden is upon the plaintiff, rather than
the defendant, no part of the defendant's evidence may be considered
on a motion of nonsuit or to direct a verdict when such evidence is not
contradicted or impeached.
The effect of defendant's evidence on motion to nonsuit can be con-
sidered for purposes other than to strengthen the plaintiff's case. If it
could not, there could never be a nonsuit at the close of all the evidence
in a court which is intellectually honest. If a plaintiff's case is strong
enough to overrule the first motion, it could never be weakened, but
only strengthened, by defendant's evidence. Unless the purpose of the
statute was to permit the defendant to break dowfi plaintiff's case, if
he can do so by evidence unchallenged and unimpeached, which ex-
plains away the inferences which the court first decided made a prima
facie case, then what was its purpose? Before the statute when a de-
fendant demurred to the plaintiff's evidence and the demurrer was over-
ruled, he had the election to keep his exception, put on evidence and go
to the jury. He could not do both. It has been said that the statute
182 N. C. 547, 550, 109 S. E. 559, 560 (1921).
2,207 N. C. 790, 792, 178 S. E. 563, 564 (1921).
208 N. C. 7, 11, 179 S. E. 11, 13 (1935).
"Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N. C. 705, 9 S. E. (2d) 479 (1940);
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §574 (1929).
1945]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
changed the rule so that a defendant can now put on his evidence and
still preserve his exception to denial of nonsuit,37* but this is no longer
true. The first exception is waived. It is only the second exception
which is preserved.38  And under the Hinsdale Act, as amended or in
its previous form, the first motion is determined on plaintiff's evidence;
but the second on "all the evidence." If it were the first exception only
which was preserved, the legislature would have said so. It expressly
provided otherwise. So there must have been some other purpose for
the legislation. And if it be asserted that the purpose was merely to
allow a defendant an exception on appeal, weaker than the first one, as
the price for permitting him to develop his case, no second motion could
or would ever be allowed in the trial court. Yet the statute provides
that the trial court shall rule on the second motion on "all the evidence,"
and it is constantly being done. If the purpose was merely to reserve
its decision on the first motion until the whole of the evidence was in,
the legislature could easily have so provided. Instead, it said the first
motion and exception should be "waived" by putting on evidence. The
court cannot reserve its decision. There seems to be no logical excuse
for evading the enforcement of the terms of the Act, that the defendant
may "again move to dismiss" (a new motion), and that it shall be de-
termined upon "all the evidence," "accepted as true and construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,"'39 including the independent
facts and circumstances proven by defendant, unchallenged and unim-
peached, which serve to "explain or make clear that which has been
offered by the plaintiff."1
4 0
But what must the court do about facts of common knowledge
which come to it by the route of judicial notice? If such judicial knowl-
edge is favorable to the plaintiff, there is no difficulty. But it may be
very unfavorable to him. In such case the court has always taken it
into consideration on any motion to nonsuit. This is a point which
probes the reasonableness and consistency of the rule.
4 '
That a court should give judgment on the whole truth, rather than
a half-truth which may be no better than a falsehood, is implicit in the
very concept of the word "court." That term implies the essence of
justice, fair-dealing, mental integrity. For a court to give judgment
"', Means v. Carolina Central R. R. Co., 126 N. C. 424, 35 S. E. 813 (1900).
This case was decided on the Act of 1897, as amended by the Act of 1899, which
provided that the defendant might "renew his motion." But the Act was amended
again in 1901, and for the phrase "renew his motion" was substituted the phrase
"again move to dismiss." The Supreme Court has never averted to this change
of language, nor discussed the purpose of the legislature in making it.
" Harrison v. N. C. R. R. Co., 194 N. C. 656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927).
"' Holt-Williamson Mfg. Co., 182 N. C. 547, 550, 109 S. E. 559, 560 (1921).
"' Harrison v. N. C. R. R. Co., 194 N. C. 656, 660, 140 S. E. 598 (1927).




on a false picture, when the truth is before it, though from the lips of
one witness rather than from another, is to depart from that concept.
Our court has never done so.
Hence, it appears that the 'decision in the Atkins case is correct.
Furthermore, the Bar should welcome the distinctions laid down therein
as guides for the consideration of this all-important problem.
CECIL J. HILL.
Negligence-Rescue-Aid to Victim After Accident as Rescue*
The plaintiff alleged that he was at home in bed and heard his
ambulance passing on its way to deliver a patient to the hospital. Sub-
sequently a loud crash was heard and the siren stopped blowing. Plain-
tiff, realizing that his ambulance had collided with something at a nearby
intersection, got up and rushed to the scene of the accident, where he
found that it had been struck by a gasoline truck due to the negligence
of defendant in parking its truck so as to obstruct the view of the inter-
section. It was bitter cold; and several persons, either wounded or
dead, were lying on the ground. The peril of the wounded being ob-
vious, the plaintiff determined to dispatch them to the hospital; and, in
his attempt to aid in lifting them into another ambulance, he over-
exerted himself causing the injury complained of. Upon demurrer it
was held that the petition set forth a cause of action for damages re-
sulting from the injuries received in the attempted rescue, the court
stating that if defendant injured a person by negligence someone might'
reasonably be expected to come to his aid, and that it was of no mo-
ment by what circumstances the rescuer appeared on the scene.1 The
dissenting judge strongly argued that the injury to the plaintiff was too
remote to be predicated on the alleged negligence of 'defendant in park-
ing its truck in this illegal manner.
2
It is generally held that when a person is exposed to imminent peril
of life or limb, through the negligent act of another, the latter will be
liable in damages for the injuries sustained by a third party in a rea-
sonable effort to rescue the one so imperiled,3 the rescuer not being
* The scope of this note is limited to those cases in .which a human being is
imperiled, purposely excluding those cases dealing with the, jeopardizing of
property.
'Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., - Ga. App. - , 32 S. E. (2d) 420
(1944).
2 See id. at - , 32 S. E. (2d) at 423 (dissenting opinion).
' Cote v. Palmer et al., 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. (2d) 595 (1940) ; Taylor Coal Co.
v. Porter's Adm'r., 164 Ky. 523, 175 S. W. 1014 (1915) ; Hatch v. Globe Laundry
Co., 137 Me. 379, 171 Atl. 387 (1934); Dixon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 207
Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030 (1910) ; Eckert v. Long Island Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. 502,
3 Am. Rep. 72 (1871) ; Norris v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 505, 67 S. E.
1017, 27 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1069 (1910) (This case is seemingly the sole authority
19451
